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a b s t r a c t 
The Android operating system has been the most popular for smartphones and tablets since 2012. This 
popularity has led to a rapid raise of Android malware in recent years. The sophistication of Android 
malware obfuscation and detection avoidance methods have significantly improved, making many tradi- 
tional malware detection methods obsolete. In this paper, we propose DL-Droid, a deep learning system 
to detect malicious Android applications through dynamic analysis using stateful input generation. Ex- 
periments performed with over 30,0 0 0 applications (benign and malware) on real devices are presented. 
Furthermore, experiments were also conducted to compare the detection performance and code cover- 
age of the stateful input generation method with the commonly used stateless approach using the deep 
learning system. Our study reveals that DL-Droid can achieve up to 97.8% detection rate (with dynamic 
features only) and 99.6% detection rate (with dynamic + static features) respectively which outperforms 
traditional machine learning techniques. Furthermore, the results highlight the significance of enhanced 
input generation for dynamic analysis as DL-Droid with the state-based input generation is shown to 
outperform the existing state-of-the-art approaches. 
© 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
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0. Introduction 
Android operating system, which is provided by Google, is pre-
icted to continue have a dramatic increase in the market with
round 1.5 billion Android-based devices to be shipped by 2021
ta . It is currently leading the mobile OS market with over 80%
arket share compared to iOS, Windows, Blackberry, and Sym-
ian OS. The availability of diverse Android markets such as Google
lay, the official store, and third-party markets makes Android de-
ices a popular target to not only legitimate developers, but also
alware developers. Over one billion devices have been sold and
ore than 65 billion downloads have been made from Google Play
 Smartphone, 0 0 0 0 ). Android apps can be found in different cate-
ories, such as educational apps, gaming apps, social media apps,
ntertainment apps, banking apps, etc. 
As a technology that is open source and widely adopted, An-
roid is facing many challenges especially with malicious applica-
ions. The malware infected apps have the ability to send text mes-∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail addresses: mkzaylaee@uqu.edu.sa (M.K. Alzaylaee), syerima@dmu.ac.uk 
S.Y. Yerima), s.sezer@qub.ac.uk (S. Sezer). 
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167-4048/© 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article uages to premium rate numbers without the user acknowledgment,
ain access to private data, or even install code that can download
nd execute additional malware on the victim’s device. The mal-
are can also be used to create mobile botnets ( Anagnostopoulos
t al., 2016 ). Over the last few years, the number of malware sam-
les attacking Android has significantly increased. According to a
ecent report from McAfee, over 2.5 million new Android malware
pps were discovered in 2017, thus increasing the number of mo-
ile malware samples in the wild to almost 25 million in 2017
 McA, 0 0 0 0 ). 
In order to mitigate the spread of malware, Google introduced a
etection mechanism to its app market in Feb 2012 called Bouncer.
ouncer tests submitted applications in a sandbox for five min-
tes in order to detect any harmful behaviours; however, it has
een shown that bouncer can be evaded by means of some simple
etection avoidance methods ( Oberheide and Miller, 2012 ). Along-
ide Bouncer, Google introduced Google Play protect in the Google
017 event ( Google Play, 2018 ). Google Play Protect is an always-on
ervice that scans the applications automatically even after instal-
ation to ensure that the installed applications remains harmless
4/7. It has been reported that over 50 billion apps are scanned
nd verified every day regardless of where they were downloadnder the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
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(  from. However, according to McAfee, Google Play Protect also failed
when tested against malware discovered in the previous 90 days
in 2017 ( McA, 0 0 0 0 ). Furthermore, most third-party stores do not
have the capability to scan and detect submitted harmful applica-
tions. Clearly, there is still a need for additional research into effi-
cient methods to detect zero-day Android malware in the wild in
order to overcome the aforementioned challenges. 
Various approaches have been proposed in previous works with
the intention of detecting Android malware. These approaches are
categorized into static analysis, dynamic analysis or hybrid anal-
ysis (where static and dynamic are used together). The methods
based on static analysis reverse engineers the application for ma-
licious code analysis. Arp et al. (2014) , Aafer et al. (2013) , Yerima
et al. (2015a) , Fan et al. (2017) , Yerima et al. (2015b) , Kang et al.
(2016b) , Cen et al. (2015) , Westyarian et al. (2015) and Kang et al.
(2016a) are few examples of detection methods using static analy-
sis. By contrast, dynamic analysis executes the application in a con-
trolled environment such as an emulator, or a real device with the
purpose of tracing its behaviour. Several dynamic approaches, such
as Enck et al. (2010) ; Alzaylaee, M.K., Yerima, S. Y., and Sezer S.
(2016) DroidBox ; Rastogi et al. (2013) ; Tam et al. (2015) tra, NVISO
have been proposed. However, the efficiency of these approaches
rely on the ability to detect the malicious behaviour during the
runtime while providing the perfect environment to kick-start the
malicious code. 
Deep learning (DL) has gained increasing attention in the ma-
chine learning community and is re-emerging as a popular method
of AI being applied in many fields ( Hou et al., 2016; 2017; Karbab
et al., 2017; LeCun et al., 2015; McLaughlin et al., 2017; Yuan et al.,
2014; 2016 ). DL classifiers have inspired a great number of effec-
tive approaches in image classification, natural language process-
ing, and speech recognition. Recently, Android malware researchers
have also been exploring DL classifiers for malware analysis in or-
der to increase detection accuracy. 
Contrary to previous deep learning based dynamic detection
works, this paper proposes and investigates a new system that ex-
ploits the advantages of deep learning coupled with dynamic state-
ful input generation, with the objective of achieving higher accu-
racy detection of zero-day Android malware. Furthermore, several
experiments are conducted using real devices to compare the per-
formance of the proposed DL based approach with those of pop-
ular machine learning classifiers. In summary, the main contribu-
tions of this paper are as follows: 
• We present DL-Droid, a deep learning-based dynamic analysis
system for Android malware detection. Unlike existing dynamic
analysis systems, DL-Droid utilizes a state-based input gener-
ation approach for enhanced code coverage thus enabling im-
proved performance. 
• Using DL-Droid, we investigate the performance of the stateful
input generation approach by utilizing the state-of-the-practice
stateless (random-based) input generation as a comparative
baseline. Higher accuracies were obtained with the stateful ap-
proach, thus highlighting the significance of enhanced input
generation for Android malware detection systems that utilize
dynamic analysis. 
• We present an extensive comparative study of DL-Droid with
seven popular machine learning classifiers. Unlike most exist-
ing studies that are based on emulators, our experiments are
conducted in a more realistic environment using real devices.
Experimental results show that DL-Droid outperforms the ac-
curacy of traditional classifiers. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 dis-
cusses the related work. Followed by the methodology and ex-
periments undertaken to evaluate DL-Droid in Section 3 Sec-ion 4 presents detailed experimental results and discussions of
hese results. Followed by the conclusion in Section 5 
. Related work 
This section discusses the related work on Android malware de-
ection, automated test input generation for Android, and recent
orks on deep learning approaches. As mentioned earlier, detect-
ng Android malware with static analysis, where the application
ill be disassembled to be examined for presence of any mali-
ious code is a popular approach. Several solutions have been de-
eloped using the static approach, utilizing features such as per-
issions, API calls, commands, and Intents. ( Aafer et al., 2013; Arp
t al., 2014; Cen et al., 2015; Fan et al., 2017; Yerima and Sezer,
019; Yerima et al., 2016a; 2015a; 2015b ), are examples of detec-
ion solutions based on static analysis. Although static analysis ap-
roaches enable more extensive code coverage, malware develop-
rs can use obfuscation techniques to hide the malicious code in
rder to evade static analysis. For example, data encryption, obfus-
ation, update attacks or polymorphic techniques. Therefore, in this
ork we only extract Android permissions statically prior to each
un, and then extract the API calls and Intents dynamically at run
ime. 
Dynamic analysis approach on the other hand, consist of run-
ing Android applications in a controlled environment such as
n Android Virtual Device (AVD) emulator emu , or Genymotion
en or in a real device in order to monitor the apps’ behaviour.
lzaylaee et al. (2017) showed that analysing Android application
n real phones is more effective in terms of stability and detecting
ore features compared to the emulator environment. Therefore,
e chose to run our analysis on features extracted from real de-
ices instead of emulators. 
Automated dynamic analysis of Android apps requires streams
f user emulated input events such as touches, gestures, or clicks
o enable greater code coverage when run in either emulator or
eal phone. Choudhary et al. (2015) demonstrated that among
he input generation tools analysed comparatively in their study
i.e. Monkey Developers (2012) , Dynodroid Machiry et al. (2013) ,
CTEve Anand et al. (2012) , A3E Azim and Neamtiu (2013) , GUIRip-
er Amalfitano et al. (2012) , SwiftHand Choi et al. (2013) , and
UMA Hao et al. (2014) ), Monkey performed the best in terms of
ode coverage. Nevertheless, in Alzaylaee et al. (2017) and Yerima
t al. (2019) investigations proved that Monkey’s code coverage ca-
ability could be surpassed by stateful approach enabled by tools
uch as DroidBot Li et al. (2017) . The same studies have also shown
hat a stateful input generation is more stable and robust com-
ared to the stateless approach enabled by Monkey. Hence, the
eep learning-based system DL-Droid proposed in this paper is
ased on the dynamic stateful input generation approach. 
The difficulty of detecting Android malware manually has led
esearches to explore the use of machine learning to automate and
peed the detection process. Arp et al. (2014) ; Dini et al. (2012) ;
eiravian and Zhu (2013) ; Rasthofer et al. (2014) ; Shabtai et al.
2012) ; Yerima et al. (2015b, 2016b) are examples of published
esearch that apply machine learning techniques to detect zero-
ay Android malware. Deep learning is re-emerging as a machine
earning approach that is growing in popularity in many fields in-
luding Android malware detection. Droid-Sec Yuan et al. (2014) is
ne of the first frameworks that applied deep learning to classify
ndroid malware, achieving 96.5% accuracy using 200 features ex-
racted by means of a hybrid (static + dynamic) approach evalu-
ted on 250 clean and 250 malware Android apps. Droid-Sec was
 preliminary work for DroidDetector Yuan et al. (2016) , where
he authors increased the number of the analysed apps to 20,0 0 0
lean and 1760 malware and achieved 96.76% accuracy. Hou et al.
2016) proposed Deep4MalDroid , an automatic Android malware
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T  etection system, which will dynamically extract Linux kernel sys-
em calls using Genymotion emulator. The best detection accuracy
hey reached was 93.68% on features extracted from 1500 benign
nd 1500 malware Android apps. Similarly, Hou et al. (2017) pro-
osed AutoDroid (automatic Android malware detection) based on
PI calls extracted using static analysis. Their system was devel-
ped using different types of deep neural networks (i.e., DBN and
AEs). The best accuracy of the DBN was 95.98% based on experi-
ents with 2500 benign and 2500 malware Android apps. 
In contrast to existing deep learning based Android malware
etection frameworks, the key differentiates of our proposed DL-
roid framework is its dynamic stateful input generation approach.
urthermore, our work is based on real devices rather than em-
lators. Moreover, we employed 420 static and dynamic features
nd achieved better performance than existing frameworks. To the
est of our knowledge, this is the first work that extensively in-
estigates Android malware on real devices using over 30,0 0 0 ap-
lications, and presents evaluations with different input generation
ethods in order to measure the impact of their code coverage ca-
abilities on the proposed DL-based malware detection approach. 
Since our approach is based on feature extraction from real de-
ices instead of emulators, the system is inherently robust against
etection avoidance techniques aimed at emulators. Dynamic ex-
raction from real devices also enables the system to overcome the
imitations of static analysis e.g. dynamic code loading, obfusca-
ion, data encryption, etc. It is also worth noting that some of the
20 features extracted are indicative of the malware incorporat-
ng these evasive behaviours, thus the deep learning system will
e automatically equipped with the ability to learn how to detect
alware with these behaviours during the training phase. 
. Methodology and experiments 
In this section, we describe the methodology and the experi-
ents which were conducted in order to evaluate the performance
f the DL-Droid approach using real phones and two different test
nput generation methods: Stateless and Stateful. 
.1. Experimental setup 
An automated platform is needed to run Android apps and ex-
ract their features. These features will be used as inputs for DL-
roid’s deep learning based classification in order to detect An-
roid malware. Since our aim is to investigate the performance
f DL-Droid through several experiments, we utilized the DynaLog
ynamic analysis framework described in Alzaylaee, M.K., Yerima,
.Y. and Sezer, S. (2016) . 
DynaLog is designed to accept and run a large number of An-
roid apps automatically, launch them in sequence using either
n emulator (an Android Virtual Device “AVD”) or a real phone,
nd log and extract several dynamic features (i.e. API calls, Ac-
ion/events). With the dynamic analysis of Android apps, test in-
ut generation is needed in order to ensure sufficient code cover-
ge to trigger the malicious behaviours. DynaLog is capable of uti-
izing different test input generation methods including: stateless
random-based) (using the Monkey tool Developers (2012) ), state-
ul (using DroidBot Li et al. (2017) ), and hybrid-based (which com-
ines stateless and stateful input generation tools Alzaylaee et al.
2017) . The stateless approach is the most popular input generation
pproach and have been used extensively by researchers in this
eld. In fact, most existing dynamic analysis platforms for Android
alware detection utilize a stateless approach (based on the Mon-
ey tool). A previous study Yerima et al. (2019) , compared the per-
ormance of stateless, stateful and hybrid-based input generation
n various machine learning classifiers. In this study, the stateful
pproach is proved to be more robust and enabled greater codeoverage than the hybrid-based input generation. Therefore, in this
aper, we used only stateless (Monkey) and stateful (DroidBot) in-
ut generation for our experiments with DL-Droid. 
The Monkey tool generates pseudo-random streams of events
ecause of a pseudo-random number generator which is controlled
y a seed. A pseudo-random stream of events is still a random ap-
roach since the event selection is not based on a pre-determined
attern, even though it is configurable. It is important to note that
andom here refers to selection of next event to be executed i.e. no
pecific pattern is followed, unlike in the stateful approach where
he event to be executed is chosen based on evaluation of the cur-
ent state (i.e. the user interfaces state at a particular time). Mon-
ey is based on a stateless approach and this is the most important
ifference that distinguishes the approach from the stateful Droid-
ot. We propose the stateful approach the default component of
he DL-Droid framework, while we utilize the stateless method as
 baseline for comparative analysis in this paper. 
Alzaylaee et al. (2017) have shown that dynamic analysis done
n real devices is more efficient than using emulators. Thus, our
xperiments are completely based on real phones. Eight different
hone brands were used with the following configurations: An-
roid 6.0 “Marshmallow”, 4GB RAM, 2.6Hz CPU, 32GB ROM and 32
B of external SD card storage. Each smartphone processed an av-
rage of 100 apps daily. The SD cards contained a folder full of dif-
erent resources such as pictures, text files, videos, sound files, etc.
o simulate a typical phone. Moreover, each phone was equipped
ith a sim card containing call credits to enable 3G data usage,
end text messages, and even make a phone calls when requested.
he phones were also connected to an internal WiFi service in or-
er to enable tested applications to connect with their external
ervers when necessary. 
The executed runtime was different on each run and deter-
ined by the chosen test input generation. The required timing
as confirmed after evaluation with several apps to determine
ow much time was needed to trigger every possible event using
ither the stateful tool (DroidBot), or the stateless tool (Monkey).
or the stateful method, 180 s was found to be sufficient. For the
tateless generation using Monkey, 300 s was enough to generate
0 0 0 events for the apps. Beyond 40 0 0 events, most apps did not
enerate any further dynamic output from Dynalog. The overview
f the DL-Droid process using DynaLog as well as the DL classifier
ngine is shown in Fig. 1 
.2. Dataset 
For the purpose of evaluating DL-Droid accuracy performance
nd to compare it with other popular machine learning classi-
ers, we used a dataset consisting 31,125 Android applications.
ut of these, 11,505 were malware samples while the rest were
9,620 internally vetted benign samples obtained from Intel Secu-
ity (McAfee Labs). These samples consist of a variety of app for-
ats, including paid apps, powerful utility apps, banking apps, me-
ia player apps, and popular game apps. The samples are available
o other researchers on request. 
.3. Features extraction and preprocessing 
In the feature extraction phase, each application is installed and
un on one of the eight phones using DynaLog ( Alzaylaee, M.K.,
erima, S. Y. and Sezer, S. 2016 ). Once completed for each of the
wo scenarios, Stateless and Stateful, the logged features are pre-
rocessed into text files of feature vectors representing the fea-
ures extracted from each application. These text files were fur-
her processed into a single.csv file for each scenario with the pur-
ose of evaluating the detection performance using deep learning.
he.csv is an acceptable file format for both H2O flow and WEKA
4 M.K. Alzaylaee, S.Y. Yerima and S. Sezer / Computers & Security 89 (2020) 101663 
Fig. 1. DL-Droid framework. 
Table 1 
Total number of the extracted features used in the ex- 
periments. 
Feature set No. of features 
Application attributes features 97 
Actions/Events features 23 
Permission features 300 
Total 420 
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F  which were used later in the experiments. Note that, each feature
in the.csv file is binary containing either ‘0’ or ‘1’ which represents
the absence or presence of each extracted features. 
Originally, DynaLog was equipped to extract 178 features dy-
namically (i.e. API calls and intents - Actions/Events). These fea-
tures were ranked using InfoGain (information gain provided by
WEKA), and then the top 120 features were selected for the exper-
iments. Dynalog was extended to enable extracting Android per-
missions statically prior to each dynamic run. This step allows us
to test the detection performance of DL-Droid with more features
as a bonus. 
Over 300 Android permissions that have been used by the
investigated Android apps that govern access to different device
hardware and system resources. These permissions are considered
as either normal, signature, or dangerous permissions. This step
allowed us to collect the most relevant permissions which some
of which were relatively new and had not been used in previous
works. Hence, as shown in Table 1 , we obtained a total of 420 fea-
tures from our feature extraction phase. The 420 extracted features
were ranked using the information gain (InfoGain) feature ranking
algorithm in WEKA. The top 20 ranked dynamic features (includ-
ing and excluding the extracted permissions) based on InfoGain
in both test input scenarios (stateless and stateful) are shown in
Tables 2 –5 respectively. 
3.4. Features ranking comparisons 
From Tables 2 , and–5 , it is interesting to note that the API calls
methods getDeviceId, getSubscriberId, getLine1Number, and get-
SimSerialNumber from the TelephonyManager class, that provides
access to information about the telephony services on the device,
were among the top 20. However, the InfoGain score is higher
for these features when extracted using DroidBot-based stateful
input generation. For example, the InfoGain score of the feature
TelephonyManager;- > getDeviceId is 0.099 in Tables 2 and 3 usingroidBot based stateful input generation, whereas the score for the
ame feature using stateless Monkey based random input genera-
ion is 0.075 in Tables 4 and 5 . 
Similar findings can be seen with the feature
elephonyManager;- > getSubscriberId which scored 0.057 us-
ng DroidBot based input generation, while the score is 0.042 for
onkey based input generation. The feature action.SMS_RECEIVED
cores 0.096 for the DroidBot based generation in Table 2 , which
s higher than the score for the same feature extracted using
onkey based generation in Table 4 Hence, this indicates that the
tateful DroidBot based input generation method has triggered
ore behaviours than the stateless Monkey based random input
eneration. Note that most existing dynamic analysis on Android
tilize the Monkey tool for input event generation. 
.5. Investigating Deep Learning Classifier vs. other popular machine 
earning algorithms 
Our main goal is to build a model for DL-Droid to enable accu-
ate classification and detection of Android malware from benign
pps. In our experiments, we train our deep learning classifiers
n a classification problem with two labels, benign or malicious.
e utilize H2O which currently supports only the Multilayer Per-
eptron classifier (MLP) Candel et al. (2016) . A confusion matrix
s performed in our system to evaluate the effectiveness of differ-
nt classifiers. The second phase of the experiments compared the
erformance between the proposed DL and seven popular machine
earning approaches proposed in the literature. The classifiers in-
lude: Support Vector Machine (SVM Linear), Support Vector Ma-
hine with radial basis function kernel (SVM RBF), Naive Bayes
NB), Simple Logistic (SL), Partial Decision Trees (PART), Random
orest (RF), and J48 Decision Tree. We also investigated the per-
ormance of each classifier for two different test input generation
ethods. The results of our experiments are presented in section
II using the performance metrics defined as follows: 
The true positive ratio (TPR) also known as recall, true negative
atio (TNR), false positive ratio (FPR), false negative ratio (FNR), and
recision are defined as follows: 
 P R = T P 
T P + F N (1)
 NR = T N 
T N + F P (2)
 P R = F P 
F P + T N (3)
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Table 2 
Top 20 Ranked Features based on InfoGain using Stateful input generation DroidBot (Per- 
missions excluded). 
Feature Malware Bening InfoGain score 
TelephonyManager;- > getDeviceId 4899 1078 0.099 
com.android.vending.INSTALL_REFERRER 741 3890 0.096 
action.SMS_RECEIVED 2421 375 0.096 
TelephonyManager;- > getSubscriberId 1993 203 0.057 
action.USER_PRESENT 2633 545 0.056 
methods/HttpPost;- >< init > 3408 1044 0.054 
TelephonyManager;- > getLine1Number 1429 163 0.043 
WifiManager;- > getConnectionInfo 2680 792 0.039 
content/Context;- > bindService 573 2271 0.037 
Ljava/util/TimerTask;- >< init > 7399 4068 0.033 
Ljava/io/FileOutputStream;- > write 3775 1563 0.032 
PackageManager;- > checkPermission 2726 858 0.032 
Landroid/net/NetworkInfo;- > getState 1632 396 0.032 
Ljava/io/File;- > exists 6217 3361 0.027 
security/MessageDigest;- > getInstance 4905 2779 0.027 
Landroid/content/Context;- > unbindService 264 1347 0.02 
action.PHONE_STATE 1030 215 0.019 
action.PACKAGE_ADDED 1540 508 0.018 
TelephonyManager;- > getSimSerialNumber 859 157 0.018 
SmsManager;- > sendTextMessage 351 2 0.018 
Table 3 
Top 20 Ranked Features based on InfoGain using Stateful input generation DroidBot 
(Permissions included). 
Feature Malware Bening InfoGain score 
permission.SEND_SMS 5128 1084 0.16 
permission.READ_PHONE_STATE 10,508 10,183 0.133 
TelephonyManager;- > getDeviceId 4899 2011 0.099 
com.android.vending.INSTALL_REFERRER 741 7285 0.096 
permission.RECEIVE_SMS 4054 1565 0.096 
action.MOUNT_UNMOUNT_FILESYSTEMS 2889 781 0.082 
permission.WRITE_SMS 2847 764 0.071 
permission.READ_SMS 3592 1429 0.07 
permission.SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW 4314 2276 0.069 
action.SMS_RECEIVED 2421 665 0.066 
TelephonyManager;- > getSubscriberId 1993 387 0.057 
action.USER_PRESENT 2633 912 0.056 
permission.INSTALL_PACKAGES 1640 290 0.054 
permission.ACCESS_MTK_MMHW 1092 29 0.047 
permission.GET_TASKS 5790 5040 0.046 
permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED 6648 6378 0.044 
methods/HttpPost;- >< init > 3408 1985 0.044 
permission.USE_CREDENTIALS 313 3369 0.043 
TelephonyManager;- > getLine1Number 1429 278 0.041 
permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE 8406 9802 0.039 
Table 4 
Top 20 Ranked Features based on InfoGain using stateless Monkey based input generation 
(Permissions excluded). 
Feature Malware Bening InfoGain score 
com.android.vending.INSTALL_REFERRER 737 6686 0.106 
TelephonyManager;- > getDeviceId 4269 1800 0.075 
action.SMS_RECEIVED 2416 608 0.057 
action.USER_PRESENT 2627 853 0.053 
TelephonyManager;- > getSubscriberId 1682 363 0.042 
TelephonyManager;- > getLine1Number 1385 286 0.035 
Landroid/content/Context;- > bindService 589 3260 0.031 
Landroid/net/NetworkInfo;- > getState 1570 593 0.026 
client/methods/HttpPost;- > < init > 2526 1634 0.022 
Ljava/io/FileOutputStream;- > write 3082 2296 0.021 
Ljava/util/TimerTask;- > < init > 6943 7564 0.021 
action.PHONE_STATE 1026 349 0.018 
TelephonyManager;- > getSimSerialNumber 896 257 0.018 
Landroid/content/Context;- > unbindService 287 1800 0.018 
wifi/WifiManager;- > getConnectionInfo 1977 1235 0.018 
action.PACKAGE_ADDED 1533 804 0.017 
/PackageManager;- > checkPermission 2111 1419 0.017 
Ljava/io/File;- > exists 5674 6027 0.016 
telephony/SmsManager;- > sendTextMessage 332 1 0.015 
action.NEW_OUTGOING_CALL 655 182 0.013 
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Table 5 
Top 20 Ranked Features based on InfoGain using stateless Monkey based input gener- 
ation (Permissions included). 
Feature Malware Bening InfoGain score 
permission.SEND_SMS 5117 1006 0.16 
permission.READ_PHONE_STATE 10,468 9146 0.135 
android.vending.INSTALL_REFERRER 737 6686 0.106 
permission.RECEIVE_SMS 4043 1420 0.082 
TelephonyManager;- > getDeviceId 4269 1800 0.075 
permission.WRITE_SMS 2841 697 0.07 
action.MOUNT_UNMOUNT_FILESYSTEMS 2879 741 0.069 
permission.READ_SMS 3584 1322 0.068 
permission.SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW 4299 2138 0.063 
action.SMS_RECEIVED 2416 608 0.057 
action.USER_PRESENT 2627 853 0.053 
permission.INSTALL_PACKAGES 1638 243 0.049 
permission.ACCESS_MTK_MMHW 1087 26 0.046 
permission.GET_TASKS 5770 4534 0.044 
permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED 6621 5760 0.043 
permission.USE_CREDENTIALS 311 3004 0.043 
TelephonyManager;- > getSubscriberId 1682 363 0.042 
permission.GET_ACCOUNTS 3012 8601 0.039 
permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE 8376 8941 0.035 
TelephonyManager;- > getLine1Number 1385 286 0.035 
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Where TP denotes the number of true positives, TN the number of
true negatives, FP the number of false positives, and FN the num-
ber of false negatives. 
FM is the F measure calculated for both malware and benign
classes. The combined measure known as weighted FM is defined
as follows: 
F M = 2 ∗ recall ∗ precision 
r ecall + pr ecision (6)
 − F M = (F m .N m ) + (F b .N b ) 
N m + N b 
(7)
Where F b and F m are the FM of the benign and malware
datasets respectively, whereas N b and N m are the number of sam-Table 6 
Deep learning results with different combinations of hidden layers (with the use of stat
No. of layers No. of Neurons TPR TNR FPR FNR Preci
2 50,50 0.9532 0.8804 0.1196 0.0468 0.931
2 100,100 0.9337 0.8896 0.1104 0.0663 0.937
2 200,200 0.9663 0.9075 0.0925 0.0337 0.947
2 300,300 0.9663 0.907 0.093 0.0337 0.946
2 400,400 0.9903 03:04.3 0.2062 0.0097 0.888
2 500,500 0.9739 0.8975 0.1025 0.0261 0.942
3 50,50,50 0.9047 0.9082 0.0918 0.0953 0.944
3 100,50,100 0.973 0.8929 0.1071 0.027 0.94 
3 50,100,50 0.9762 0.8832 0.1168 0.0238 0.934
3 100,100,100 0.7478 0.9542 0.0458 0.2522 0.964
3 100,200,100 0.5356 0.9868 0.0132 0.4644 0.985
3 200,100,200 0.4526 0.9997 0.0003 0.5474 0.999
3 200,200,200 0.9776 0.9086 0.0914 0.0224 0.948
3 300,100,300 0.5384 0.9986 0.0014 0.4616 0.998
3 300,300,300 0.9735 0.9055 0.0945 0.0265 0.944
3 400,400,400 0.7219 0.9842 0.0158 0.2781 0.987
3 500,500,500 0.9738 0.9089 0.0911 0.0262 0.947
4 50,50,50,50 0.9567 0.8949 0.1051 0.0433 0.939
4 100,100,100,100 0.5671 0.9986 0.0014 0.4329 0.998
4 200,200,200,200 0.9744 0.9109 0.0891 0.0256 0.948
4 300,300,300,300 0.9868 0.8552 0.1448 0.0132 0.920
4 400,400,400,400 0.9622 0.885 0.115 0.0378 0.935les in the benign and malware datasets respectively. The 10-fold
ross validation approach was used in all of the presented experi-
ents. 
. Experimental results and discussions 
.1. Deep learning classifier analysis 
.1.1. DL comparisons with dynamic features: Stateful vs. Stateless 
nput generation 
Table 6 depicts the results of experiments undertaken to eval-
ate the performance of the DL approach with different combina-
ions of hidden layers. The results shown here is for the dynamic
eatures only, using the stateful Droidbot input generation tool. 22
ifferent combinations of hidden neurons, containing two, three,
nd four layers, have been applied in order to determine the best
ossible performance based on the w-FM. At Table 6 , the results
how that the 20 0, 20 0, 20 0 combination performs the best when
ompared to other combinations, with running time of nine min-eful input generation and dynamic features only). 
sion Recall Accuracy w-FM AUC Running time (min:sec) 
7 0.9532 0.9264 0.9423 0.971476 01:35 
4 0.9337 0.9178 0.9355 0.965159 03:14 
9 0.9663 0.9449 0.957 0.981357 06:31 
9 0.9663 0.9445 0.9565 0.982852 10:46 
9 0.9903 0.9166 0.9369 0.895044 13:44 
8 0.9739 0.946 0.9581 0.982761 18:46 
7 0.9047 0.906 0.9243 0.928607 01:50 
0.973 0.9436 0.9562 0.982075 03:19 
 0.9762 0.9417 0.9546 0.979091 02:14 
9 0.7478 0.8246 0.8426 0.861435 03:50 
4 0.5356 0.7046 0.694 0.76359 05:06 
6 0.4526 0.6536 0.6231 0.726156 06:42 
2 0.9776 0.9521 0.9627 0.986742 09:05 
5 0.5384 0.7086 0.6996 0.768651 09:08 
5 0.9735 0.9479 0.9588 0.9838 13:56 
5 0.7219 0.8183 0.8341 0.85698 20:40 
8 0.9738 0.9497 0.9606 0.984606 26:44 
7 0.9567 0.9339 0.9482 0.97666 01:58 
6 0.5671 0.7248 0.7234 0.783015 04:24 
8 0.9744 0.9508 0.9614 0.984959 10:39 
6 0.9868 0.9381 0.9525 0.921231 18:39 
3 0.9622 0.9339 0.9485 0.975693 29:28 
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Table 7 
Deep learning results with different combinations of hidden layers (with the use of stateful input generation and static + dynamic features). 
No. of layers No. of Neurons TPR TNR FPR FNR Precision Recall Accuracy w-FM AUC Running time (min:sec) 
2 50,50 0.8701 0.9252 0.0748 0.1299 0.952 0.8701 0.8904 0.9092 0.920539 03:43 
2 100,100 0.9669 0.9162 0.0838 0.0331 0.9516 0.9669 0.9482 0.9592 0.980748 07:18 
2 200,200 0.9661 0.8771 0.1229 0.0339 0.9306 0.9661 0.9332 0.948 0.970208 14:51 
2 300,300 0.9693 0.9121 0.0879 0.0307 0.9495 0.9693 0.9481 0.9593 0.980417 21:42 
2 400,400 0.972 0.9082 0.0918 0.028 0.9475 0.972 0.9484 0.9596 0.978372 30:50 
2 500,500 0.9735 0.9261 0.0739 0.0265 0.9574 0.9735 0.956 0.9654 0.983072 36:36 
3 50,50,50 0.9718 0.9059 0.0941 0.0282 0.9462 0.9718 0.9474 0.9588 0.978387 04:05 
3 100,50,100 0.9718 0.9149 0.0851 0.0282 0.9512 0.9718 0.9507 0.9613 0.983224 07:38 
3 50,100,50 0.9646 0.8707 0.1293 0.0354 0.9271 0.9646 0.9299 0.9455 0.976274 04:34 
3 100,100,100 0.9733 0.9202 0.0798 0.0267 0.9541 0.9733 0.9537 0.9636 0.982417 08:33 
3 100,200,100 0.9737 0.9231 0.0769 0.0263 0.9557 0.9737 0.955 0.9647 0.984257 09:40 
3 200,100,200 0.9733 0.9314 0.0686 0.0267 0.9603 0.9733 0.9578 0.9668 0.984114 15:13 
3 200,200,200 0.9956 0.967 0.033 0.0044 0.9809 0.9956 0.985 0.9882 0.997105 17:21 
3 300,100,300 0.976 0.9089 0.0911 0.024 0.9481 0.976 0.9512 0.9618 0.980004 22:34 
3 300,300,300 0.9762 0.912 0.088 0.0238 0.9498 0.9762 0.9525 0.9628 0.982277 26:29 
3 400,400,400 0.9764 0.9166 0.0834 0.0236 0.9523 0.9764 0.9543 0.9642 0.982026 38:16 
3 500,500,500 0.9765 0.9287 0.0713 0.0235 0.959 0.9765 0.9588 0.9676 0.983941 49:31 
4 50,50,50,50 0.9676 0.9195 0.0805 0.0324 0.9535 0.9676 0.9498 0.9605 0.981414 04:31 
4 100,100,100,100 0.9661 0.9265 0.0735 0.0339 0.9573 0.9661 0.9515 0.9617 0.982657 09:29 
4 200,200,200,200 0.9757 0.9207 0.0793 0.0243 0.9545 0.9757 0.9553 0.965 0.982594 20:05 
4 300,300,300,300 0.9739 0.9131 0.0869 0.0261 0.9503 0.9739 0.9514 0.9619 0.980652 36:36 
4 400,400,400,400 0.9717 0.9093 0.0907 0.0283 0.9481 0.9717 0.9486 0.9597 0.982227 43:52 
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m  tes. We can see that DL can achieve w-FM of 0.963 when setting
he number of layers to 3 and selecting 200 neurons in each layer
ith dynamic features only. 
We repeated the same experiments on the dynamic features ex-
racted using the stateless Monkey based random input generation
ool in order to compare the results with the previous scenario.
able 8 shows the results obtained. The best w-FM is also recorded
ith three layers similar to the previous scenario. However, this
s obtained with different combination of neurons. The number of
eurons in each layer is 30 0, 10 0, 30 0 respectively for the best w-
M of 0.958. Even though the running time is 8 minutes, which is
ess by almost one minute, our focus has been the detection ac-
uracy. Therefore, from Tables 6 and 8 , we can confirm that the
L-Droid achieves its best performance with the features obtained
rom the use of the stateful input generation approach. 
.1.2. DL comparisons with dynamic features and static features: 
tateless vs. Stateful input generation 
The same experiments outlined in the previous section were re-
eated with the addition of static features, i.e. permissions, and re-
ults are shown in Table 7 We can see that the same combination
f 200 neurons in each hidden layer with three hidden layers is su-
erior to the other deep networks for Android malware detection
sing the stateful input generation approach. The w-FM reached
pproximately 0.99. 
.2. Comparison of the performance of the Deep Learning Classifier 
ith other popular machine learning classifiers 
In this section, we compare the detection accuracies of the pro-
osed DL approach with the most popular machine learning al-
orithms as shown in Tables 10 and 11 . Overall seven machine
earning algorithms were selected based on results of several pre-
iminary experiments had been conducted. From the tables, we
an clearly see that the proposed DL approach outperforms the
ther machine learning algorithms. In Table 10 , where results from
nly dynamic features are presented, the second highest w-FM of
.94 is achieved by the Random Forest algorithm, while that of
he deep learning approach is 0.963. When we perform further
omparison by adding permissions to the analysis ( Table 11 ), the
L approach still topped the rest with a w-FM of nearly 0.99,
hile the next highest, which is again Random Forest, achieved
w   w-FM of 0.97. We can clearly observe that the addition of
tatic features i.e. permissions improved the detection accuracy of
L-Droid. 
Fig. 2 , presents the results of comparison between the two in-
ut generation methods i.e. stateful (using Droidbot) and stateless
using monkey). Fig. 2 shows the w-FM results for DL-Droid as
ell as the selected seven popular machine learning algorithms.
n the experiments with dynamic features only, all classifiers ex-
ept for NB and J48, performed better where stateful input gen-
ration with Droidbot was utilized, compared to the stateless ap-
roach using Monkey. However, in the experiment with combined
tatic and dynamic features, the stateful input generation approach
as superior for all the classifiers. With these results depicted in
ig. 2 , we can conclude that DL-Droid with stateful input genera-
ion (our initially proposed approach) achieves the best detection
ccuracy. 
.3. Results comparison with existing work 
Table 12 , presents a comparison of DL-Droid performance with
ther existing deep learning based methods for Android malware
etection. DroidDetector’s static and dynamic based deep learning
ethod achieved 96.76% accuracy compared to DL-Droid which has
8.5% accuracy. DL-Droid outperformed DroidDetector ( Yuan et al.,
016 ) in all other metrics, while utilizing more samples for the
xperiments. DL-Droid also outperforms Maldozer ( Karbab et al.,
017 ), Deep4MalDroid ( Hou et al., 2016 ), AutoDroid ( Hou et al.,
017 ) and the CNN approach presented in ( McLaughlin et al., 2017 ).
t is interesting to note that, just like in Deep4MalDroid and Auto-
roid, the number of the optimum hidden layers for DL-Droid is
hree. 
. Conclusion 
In this paper, we presented DL-Droid, an automated dynamic
nalysis framework for Android malware detection. DL-Droid em-
loys deep learning with a state-based input generation approach
s the default method, although it has the capability to employ the
tate-of-the-practice popular Monkey tool (stateless method). We
valuated DL-Droid using 31,125 Android applications, 420 static
nd dynamic features, comparing its performance to traditional
achine learning classifiers as well as existing DL-based frame-
orks. The presented results clearly demonstrate that DL-Droid
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Table 8 
Deep learning results with different combinations of hidden layers (with the use of stateless input generation and dynamic features only). 
No. of layers No. of Neurons TPR TNR FPR FNR Precision Recall Accuracy w-FM AUC Running time (min:sec) 
3 100,100,100 0.6111 0.9954 0.0046 0.3889 0.9951 0.6111 0.7619 0.7572 0.803875 03:31 
3 50,100,50 0.6285 0.967 0.033 0.3715 0.9659 0.6285 0.7648 0.7615 0.806743 02:00 
2 400,400 0.726 0.9615 0.0385 0.274 0.9666 0.726 0.8189 0.8292 0.854101 12:33 
2 100,100 0.8221 0.9105 0.0895 0.1779 0.9321 0.8221 0.8575 0.8736 0.886959 02:53 
2 50,50 0.8795 0.8266 0.1734 0.1205 0.8867 0.8795 0.8587 0.8831 0.89001 01:26 
3 500,500,500 0.997 0.7606 0.2394 0.003 0.8622 0.997 0.9025 0.9247 0.879508 06:10 
3 100,50,100 0.9233 0.9081 0.0919 0.0767 0.9372 0.9233 0.9172 0.9302 0.940436 02:52 
3 50,50,50 0.9526 0.8824 0.1176 0.0474 0.9257 0.9526 0.9249 0.9389 0.973505 01:36 
4 300,300,300,300 0.9672 0.8975 0.1025 0.0328 0.9349 0.9672 0.9396 0.9508 0.981281 17:00 
4 50,50,50,50 0.9671 0.8977 0.1023 0.0329 0.9355 0.9671 0.9397 0.951 0.979724 01:49 
3 200,200,200 0.9764 0.8905 0.1095 0.0236 0.9302 0.9764 0.942 0.9527 0.984125 07:12 
4 100,100,100,100 0.9752 0.8902 0.1098 0.0248 0.9311 0.9752 0.9415 0.9527 0.981828 04:14 
2 500,500 0.971 0.901 0.099 0.029 0.9363 0.971 0.943 0.9533 0.982513 16:08 
4 200,200,200,200 0.9791 0.8831 0.1169 0.0209 0.9293 0.9791 0.9417 0.9535 0.981191 09:53 
4 400,400,400,400 0.973 0.8978 0.1022 0.027 0.9359 0.973 0.9433 0.9541 0.982963 25:48 
3 300,300,300 0.9754 0.8945 0.1055 0.0246 0.9342 0.9754 0.9435 0.9543 0.980887 11:57 
3 200,100,200 0.9717 0.903 0.097 0.0283 0.9384 0.9717 0.9444 0.9547 0.983906 05:50 
2 200,200 0.9696 0.9077 0.0923 0.0304 0.9415 0.9696 0.9452 0.9553 0.982541 06:19 
3 400,400,400 0.9759 0.8963 0.1037 0.0241 0.9355 0.9759 0.9446 0.9553 0.983396 16:45 
3 100,200,100 0.9741 0.9104 0.0896 0.0259 0.943 0.9741 0.9488 0.9583 0.985178 04:23 
2 300,300 0.9798 0.8997 0.1003 0.0202 0.9386 0.9798 0.9486 0.9588 0.984684 09:37 
3 300,100,300 0.9778 0.9064 0.0936 0.0222 0.9408 0.9778 0.9495 0.9589 0.985202 08:08 
Table 9 
Deep learning results with different combinations of hidden layers (with the use of stateless input generation and static + dynamic features). 
No. of layers No. of Neurons TPR TNR FPR FNR Precision Recall Accuracy w-FM AUC Running time (min:sec) 
2 50,50 0.8788 0.8905 0.1095 0.1212 0.9244 0.8788 0.8834 0.901 0.916957 03:32 
2 200,200 0.9246 0.8612 0.1388 0.0754 0.9102 0.9246 0.8995 0.9174 0.956576 14:11 
3 50,50,50 0.9443 0.8505 0.1495 0.0557 0.9058 0.9443 0.9071 0.9247 0.961333 03:46 
3 50,100,50 0.9403 0.87 0.13 0.0597 0.9168 0.9403 0.9125 0.9284 0.963836 04:18 
2 100,100 0.9569 0.8841 0.1159 0.0431 0.9263 0.9569 0.928 0.9413 0.971361 07:18 
4 400,400,400,400 0.9703 0.8882 0.1118 0.0297 0.9296 0.9703 0.9377 0.9495 0.975414 44:27 
2 300,300 0.9625 0.9063 0.0937 0.0375 0.9399 0.9625 0.9402 0.9511 0.978022 21:32 
3 200,200,200 0.9609 0.9131 0.0869 0.0391 0.9439 0.9609 0.942 0.9524 0.977116 16:27 
4 50,50,50,50 0.9653 0.906 0.094 0.0347 0.9399 0.9653 0.9418 0.9525 0.977894 04:12 
3 300,100,300 0.9764 0.8921 0.1079 0.0236 0.9323 0.9764 0.943 0.9539 0.977185 21:11 
4 100,100,100,100 0.9649 0.9125 0.0875 0.0351 0.9438 0.9649 0.9441 0.9542 0.979354 08:42 
3 100,100,100 0.9627 0.9191 0.0809 0.0373 0.9477 0.9627 0.9454 0.9551 0.98 07:51 
4 300,300,300,300 0.9671 0.9137 0.0863 0.0329 0.9446 0.9671 0.9459 0.9557 0.979939 36:36 
2 400,400 0.9755 0.901 0.099 0.0245 0.9375 0.9755 0.9459 0.9561 0.980394 28:08 
4 200,200,200,200 0.9711 0.9107 0.0893 0.0289 0.9431 0.9711 0.9472 0.9569 0.981067 19:10 
2 500,500 0.9693 0.9155 0.0845 0.0307 0.9459 0.9693 0.948 0.9575 0.980055 34:25 
3 100,50,100 0.9707 0.9148 0.0852 0.0293 0.9455 0.9707 0.9486 0.958 0.980691 07:16 
3 200,100,200 0.9658 0.9261 0.0739 0.0342 0.9521 0.9658 0.9501 0.9589 0.981751 15:04 
3 100,200,100 0.9668 0.9251 0.0749 0.0332 0.9516 0.9668 0.9503 0.9591 0.982598 09:29 
3 300,300,300 0.9649 0.9301 0.0699 0.0351 0.9546 0.9649 0.9511 0.9597 0.981693 25:08 
3 500,500,500 0.9732 0.9248 0.0752 0.0268 0.9517 0.9732 0.954 0.9623 0.984339 48:29 
3 400,400,400 0.9719 0.9272 0.0728 0.0281 0.9531 0.9719 0.9542 0.9624 0.983771 38:19 
Table 10 
Results for DL and seven machine learning algorithms (with stateful input generation and dynamic 
features only). 
TPR TNR FPR FNR Precision Recall w-FM 
NB 0.62 0.855 0.145 0.38 0.765 0.768 0.764 
SL 0.761 0.933 0.067 0.239 0.87 0.87 0.868 
SVM Linear 0.758 0.938 0.062 0.242 0.872 0.872 0.87 
SVM RBF 0.758 0.944 0.056 0.242 0.876 0.875 0.873 
J48 0.855 0.954 0.046 0.145 0.917 0.918 0.917 
PART 0.861 0.955 0.045 0.139 0.92 0.92 0.92 
RF 0.88 0.971 0.029 0.12 0.938 0.938 0.937 
DL(200,200,200) 0.9776 0.9086 0.0914 0.0224 0.9482 0.9776 0.9627 
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Aachieved high accuracy performance reaching better figures than
those presented in existing deep learning-based Android malware
detection frameworks. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first work to investigate deep learning using dynamic features ex-
tracted from apps using real phones. Our results also highlight
the significance of enhancing input generation for dynamic anal-sis systems that are designed to detect Android malware using
achine learning. As future work, self-adaptation such as intro-
uced and investigated recently for Intrusion Detection systems
 Papamartzivanos et al., 2019 ) could be explored as a means of
mproving the performance of the deep learning based system for
ndroid malware detection. 
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Table 11 
Results for DL and seven machine learning algorithms (with stateful input generation and static 
+ dynamic features). 
TPR TNR FPR FNR Precision Recall w-FM 
NB 0.816 0.886 0.114 0.184 0.86 0.86 0.86 
SL 0.871 0.957 0.043 0.129 0.925 0.925 0.924 
SVM RBF 0.871 0.957 0.043 0.129 0.925 0.925 0.924 
SVM Linear 0.875 0.964 0.036 0.125 0.931 0.931 0.931 
J48 0.919 0.967 0.033 0.081 0.949 0.949 0.949 
PART 0.931 0.968 0.032 0.069 0.954 0.954 0.954 
RF 0.941 0.988 0.012 0.059 0.971 0.971 0.971 
DL(200,200,200) 0.9956 0.967 0.033 0.0044 0.9809 0.9956 0.9882 
Fig. 2. w-FM for DL-Droid and seven selected ML algorithms. Stateful vs. stateless input generation. 
Table 12 
Comparisons of DL-Droid with other existing deep learning approaches. 
Classification System Extracted Features Types Benign Malware No. of neurons Acc. Prec. Recall F-score 
DroidDetector Yuan et al. (2016) Static only 880 880 [150,150] 89.03 90.39 89.04 89.76 
DroidDetector Yuan et al. (2016) Dynamic only 880 880 [150,150] 71.25 72.59 71.25 71.92 
DroidDetector Yuan et al. (2016) Static & Dynamic 880 880 [150,150] 96.76 96.78 96.76 96.76 
CNN McLaughlin et al. (2017) Static (opcode) 863 1260 N/A 98 99 95 97 
MalDozer Karbab et al. (2017) Static only 37,627 20,089 N/A N/A 96.29 96.29 96.29 
Deep4MalDroid Hou et al. (2016) Dynamic (sys. Calls) 1,500 1,500 [200,200,200] 93.68 93.96 93.36 93.68 
AutoDroid Hou et al. (2017) Static only 2,500 2,500 [200,200,200] 96.66 96.55 96.76 96.66 
DL-Droid (Stateless) Dynamic only 19,620 11,505 [300,100,300] 94.95 94.08 97.78 95.89 
DL-Droid (Stateless) Static & Dynamic 19,620 11,505 [400,400,400] ( Table 9 ) 95.42 95.31 97.19 96.24 
DL-Droid (Stateful) Dynamic only 19,620 11,505 [200,200,200] 95.21 94.82 97.76 96.27 
DL-Droid (Stateful) Static & Dynamic 19,620 11,505 [200,200,200] 98.5 98.09 99.56 98.82 
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